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New Nation Movement NPC and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 
2020 (6) SA 257 (CC) 
Dunia P. Zongwe1 
The facts and the High Court judgment 
This case will impact constitutional law, constitutional interpretation, and electoral law in the 
sense that it will likely remain for a long time the leading case on independent candidates in 
South Africa. With the decision in New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of 
South Africa (hereinafter referred to as ‘NNM’),2 the Constitutional Court has enabled South 
Africa to join nations like Namibia in permitting independent candidates. 
In late 2018, five persons instituted an urgent application at Western Cape division of the High 
Court. In their application, New Nations Movement NPC, Ms. Chantal Dawn Revell, GRO, 
Indigenous First Nation Advocacy SA PBO, and the Mediation Foundation for Peace and 
Justice NPC cited four persons as respondents, namely the President of the Republic, the 
Speaker of the National Assembly, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Electoral 
Commission. 
The applicants argued that the Electoral Act violates section 19(3)(b) of the Constitution for 
unjustifiably limiting the right to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office. Some of 
the applicants also submitted that the Electoral Act infringed their right to freedom of 
association, enshrined in section 18 of the Constitution. 
The Cape Town-based court dismissed the application, ruling that nowhere in section 19(3)(b) 
of the Constitution does it provide for the right to stand office as an independent candidate, as 
opposed to a member of a political party.3 The court held that other provisions of the 
Constitution belie the applicants’ argument, for example, those relating to South Africa’s 
‘multi-party system’ (section 1(d)) and to the discretion of Parliament to prescribe – through 
national legislation – the electoral system that applies to the National Assembly and the 
provincial legislatures (sections 46(1)(a) and 105(1)(a)). 
Desai J quoted with approval Majola v State President of the Republic of South Africa,4 which 
dealt with almost identical facts and which observed that section 1(d)(on the ‘multi-party 
system) entrenched a party system in South Africa.5 Perhaps more importantly, the judge in 
NNM leaned on the Constitutional Court judgment in Ramakatsa v Magashule,6 to claim that 
section 19 ‘locates political parties at the centre of political rights’.7  
Desai J also relied on the Constitutional Court judgment in New National Party of South Africa 
v Government of the Republic of South Africa8 to hold that ‘the mere existence of the right to 
                                                          
1 Associate Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Walter Sisulu University. J.S.D. (Cornell); LL.M. (Cornell); 
Cert. (Univ. Montréal); LL.B. (Univ. Namibia); B.Juris (Univ. Namibia). 
2 New Nation Movement NPC and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2020 (6) SA 257 
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vote without proper arrangements for its effective exercise does nothing for a democracy, it is 
both empty and useless’.9 He noted that, apparently, no legislative framework existed to 
facilitate independent members standing for election. However, Desai J distinguished the NNM 
case from the Constitutional Court judgment in My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and 
Correctional Services, in which Mogoeng CJ read section 19 as meaning that ‘every adult 
citizen may in terms of the Constitution stand as an independent candidate to be elected to 
municipalities, provincial legislatures or the National Assembly’.10 Desai J treated Mogoeng’s 
holding as a ‘remark’ and as ‘obiter’ that, accordingly, did not bind the High Court.11 
Crucially, Desai J found that, at best for the applicants, the Constitution does not proscribe a 
system which permits independents to run.12 The Constitution permits Parliament to choose 
between allowing independents to run at national and provincial levels, and only allowing them 
to run at local level.13 Once Parliament has made the choice, that choice does not violate the 
Constitution.14 For that reason and those mentioned above, Desai J dismissed the applicants’ 
case.15 
The decision of the Constitutional Court 
Except for the Mediation Foundation for Peace and Justice NPC,16 the applicants sought leave 
to appeal to the Constitutional Court against Desai J’s High Court decision. The Constitutional 
Court resolved the independent candidate question in the applicants’ favour. Though 
Froneman J dissented, the majority judgment, penned by Madlanga J, accepted the applicants’ 
arguments that the Electoral Act violated the right to vote (section 19), the right to freedom of 
association (section 18), the right to dignity, and freedom of conscience.17 
Before delving into the specific rulings of the court’s majority, a recital of how the Constitution 
provides for the right to vote, the right to freedom of association, and the multi-party system 
appears apposite. Section 19 of the Constitution lays down that: 
Every citizen is free to make political choices, which includes the right — 
(a) to form a political party; 
(b) to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; and 
(c) to campaign for a political party or cause. 
For its part, Section 18 stipulates that ‘[e]veryone has the right to freedom of association’. 
In addition, Section 1(d) of the Constitution defines South Africa as a sovereign, democratic 
state founded on ‘[u]niversal adult suffrage, a national common voter’s roll, regular elections 
and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness 
and openness’.18  
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18 Emphasis added. 




Writing for the majority,19 Madlanga J held that, in essence, section 19 of the Constitution gave 
the right to South Africans to stand for public office as independent candidates. 
Both Madlanga and Jafta recognized that the Constitution and the Electoral Act did not 
expressly provide for the right of individuals to run for political office as independent 
candidates. However, they insisted that the principle of harmonious interpretation demands that 
judges construe the Constitution in such a manner as not to offend other rights provided for in 
the Constitution, including especially the right to vote in Section 19 and the right to freedom 
of association in Section 18.20 
By adopting the principle of harmonious interpretation, the majority of the judges held that the 
applicants had the right to run for office as independent candidates, even if the Constitution 
and the Electoral Act did not provide for independent candidacy. 
In coming up with that conclusion, Madlanga J noted that, at the very least, the silence about 
independent candidates in the Constitution and the Electoral Act meant that they both did not 
prohibit or allow those candidates. Still, in order to avoid contravening the freedom of 
association, these provisions had to be read as obliging the state to allow independent 
candidates to run for office. 
Madlanga J reasoned that freedom of association entails the freedom of every individual to 
choose whomsoever they wish to associate with and their freedom to choose with whom not to 
associate – i.e., a negative right to freedom of association. In particular, Madlanga J recalled 
that Article 10 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights specifically provides for 
the negative right to freedom of association:21 ‘No one may be compelled to join an 
association.’22 
Freedom of association entails the duty of the state to allow the freedom not to associate with 
others in a political party.23 With that definition in mind, forcing individuals to join political 
parties in order to run for office would violate the constitutionally protected right to freedom 
of association. 
Froneman J dissented from the majority opinion of his brethren. He contended that to conclude 
that a harmonious interpretation of the Constitution would inevitably lead to an acceptance of 
independent candidates was flawed. He said that section 19 of the Constitution was neither 
prescriptive nor permissive, which meant that prescribing independent candidacy involves 
necessarily a lapse in logic. The proper logical reasoning would lead one to conclude that 
whether legislation authorizes or proscribes independent candidacy is not something that the 
Constitution decides. 
Rather, according to Froneman J, the best solution would be to rule that the decision as to 
whether to allow independent candidates is best left to Parliament. Echoing Desai J in the court 
below, Froneman J recalled that, in an earlier case, the Constitutional Court itself accepted the 
principle that the electoral system is decided and designed by Parliament. Relying on that 
principle, he inferred that the Constitution’s silence on whether to allow independent candidacy 
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does not mean that it accepts independent candidacy to avoid a tension with the freedom of 
association. 
Froneman J, in the end, held that he would have dismissed the applicants’ appeal on the basis 
that Parliament, and not the courts, should decide on the electoral system and, especially, on 
whether no-party representation or independent candidacy should take place in South Africa. 
Significance of the judgment 
This case will impact constitutional law, constitutional interpretation, and electoral law in the 
sense that it will likely remain for a long time the leading case on independent candidates in 
South Africa. This is an important question that has also been raised elsewhere, like it did 
recently in Namibia. In both South Africa and Namibia, the question was raised as to the 
desirability of independent candidates. With the decision in NNM, the Constitutional Court has 
enabled South Africa to join nations like Namibia in permitting independent candidates. 
Indeed, in the latest presidential elections in Namibia, independent candidates, such as 
Panduleni Itula, successfully ran and even managed to make the long-time ruling party 
SWAPO to lose its super-majority in Parliament. 
However, in South Africa and Namibia, just as in the United States, the question of whether 
independent candidates should run for political office does not only involve questions of law. 
In a very practical manner, it is a question that calls for the economics of running for political 
office. While Froneman J relies on logic, I rely on economics or economic logic. 
Allowing everyone to run for political office can drain the resources at the state’s disposal to 
organize and monitor elections. In particular, if the state allows everyone to run, this could lead 
to an influx of candidates and chancers to run for office, which may overwhelm the body tasked 
with the organization of election. So the real limitation to independent candidacy could be 
economic, in that the ability to inscribe all hopefuls on the ballots will be hugely curtailed. For 
instance, because of the high number of candidates, countries like the DRC had to produce 
ballots that ran over several pages. 
It may be more sensible for Parliament or for the law in general for candidates, whether 
independent or institutional, to post bail in order to signal their commitment and seriousness to 
run for office, as opposed to a situation where virtually anybody who can write his or her name 
on a form can run for office and thus flood electoral offices. 
So I agree with Froneman that the matter will be best left to Parliament, not because judges do 
not have the cognitive ability to do it, but because members of Parliament have more resources 
and more time to think about the best possible design of South Africa’s electoral system. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
